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ABSTRACT 
Although the use of lead-based paint in residential buildings was banned in 1978, many 
aging buildings still contain hazardous lead content. Government systems have begun treating 
this environmental hazard as an issue of public health, organizing intervention according to 
measurable health indicators such as the blood lead level (BLL). As a result, public health norms 
organize and dictate who receives state assistance in removing lead from their home, 
constructing a specific demographic of “qualified” recipients of aid. Using qualitative interviews 
with residents and city officials, this thesis will analyze a local lead abatement program in San 
Antonio, Texas in order to evaluate how these categories of qualifications are constructed around 
dominant forms of public health intervention. I find that this production of the qualified 
translates the material issue of lead-based paint’s existence in structures into a project that is 
measurable on bodies and populations, making it more legible for a neoliberal system of resource 
allocation.  
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PRODUCING THE QUALIFIED: RESOURCE ALLOCATION FOR LEAD 
ABATEMENT IN SAN ANTONIO 
 
INTRODUCTION 
In U.S. cities, aging infrastructure and outdated building materials jeopardize one’s 
ability to live in one’s own home safely. Environmental contaminants exist in everyday 
surroundings, constituting highly toxic threats to physical health that are often difficult to see, yet 
are constitutive of the very structure in which residents live. Sweeping national policies allocate 
grant funds intended to abate such toxic hazards and replace them with other materials deemed 
“safe” by updated standards in an effort to bring living spaces up to code. Of these 
environmental health hazards in living spaces, one of the most widespread and long-lasting is 
lead-based paint.  
Starting with the nationwide ban on all consumer use of lead-based paint in 1978 , the 1
federal government began to target lead paint as a “public health” concern (Environmental 
Protection Agency 2019). This increased focus led to further and more specific policies intended 
to reduce the burden of disease caused by lead-based paint, including the Residential Lead-Based 
Paint Hazard Reduction Act of 1992 (Environmental Protection Agency 2016). However, as this 
thesis will illustrate, rather than repairing toxic lead-based conditions universally, these policies 
may prioritize resources for certain populations seen as more “at-risk” of long-lasting health 
1 The average blood lead level in children ages 1 to 5 dropped from 14.9 μg/dL in 1976 to 1.7 μg/dL in 
2006 (Gould 2009). 
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consequences . Such national definitions of who is supposed to benefit from lead abatement 2
policies are reflected in local policies which distribute resources at the municipal level. 
In San Antonio, Texas, lead-based paint in houses poses a threat to those who still live in 
or near these homes. Microscopic lead dust particles, released when aging lead-based paint 
cracks or peels, pose anthropogenic threats that surround vulnerable people. To remove this 
threat and mitigate harm to residents’ health, San Antonio’s Green and Healthy Homes (GHH) 
program offers free renovations to residents with lead-based paint in their homes. This local 
program, the result of a Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) grant, aims to 
reduce lead risks in privately-owned or rented residential properties (City of San Antonio 2018). 
However, these resources are only available to households that fall below a specific income level 
(80% or below HUD’s Area Median Income) and have children who are under six years old. 
Qualifying for this at-risk status requires tax records and proof of income level, restricting the 
beneficiaries of these resources to those who meet a specific vision of “public health” need . 3
Only those who fit the description of this program’s target population may participate in 
state-provided assistance to remove the dangerous contaminants from their surroundings. 
This thesis aims to evaluate the nationally-defined categories by which people qualify for 
city resources, which subsequently trickle down into local policies to determine who accesses 
state-assisted health. I investigate the processes by which contaminants in urban settings are 
mitigated, removed, and/or tolerated by government institutions, as well as how systems of 
2 ​Extended lead exposure in children is associated with effects on stature and cognitive function, among 
other measures (Needleman 1988, Schwartz, Angle, and Pitcher 1986). 
3 ​The specific requirements for applicants to GHH are outlined in detail below in my analysis, but include 
requirements related to the age of the home, the age of the child, the family’s income level, and proof of 
ownership. 
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public health are constructed around a particular ideal of the perfect beneficiary, whether based 
on measurable health indicators or “marketable” goals that may guarantee funding. As lead 
exposure and its social characteristics become a growing area of study  within medical 4
anthropology and sociology (Muller et. al 2018), so too has the importance of knowing the 
process by which governments seek out clients and target specific populations to benefit from 
public health resources. I argue that this prioritization process transforms the material issue of 
environmental health hazards into a reification of public health norms that rely on efficiency and 
the maximization of health outcomes on the bodies of specific populations.  
 
A Lead-threatened Neighborhood in Flux 
This thesis will focus predominantly on the Dignowity Hill neighborhood, on the East 
Side of San Antonio. The East Side developed out of freed slave settlements dating back to the 
1870s, and has long been a historically-black residential area (Davis 2017). Bordered to the west 
by Interstate 37, Dignowity Hill lies just outside the Central Loop of highways that enclose 
Downtown. What was once a relatively low-income neighborhood has, in the past few decades, 
become a more attractive spot for affluent homeowners looking for a neighborhood close to the 
downtown area. Long-time residents have seen property values and taxes skyrocket in recent 
years as new businesses like the Alamo Beer Company have moved in. From 2013-2018, the 
median home value in Dignowity Hill increased 210 percent (Brezosky 2017, McNeel 2012, 
Olivo 2018). In 2014 Dignowity was designated by the Obama administration as part of a 22 
4 ​Much of this research focuses on the racial and ethnic inequalities in lead exposure, and how these toxic 
structures are intensely stratified (Muller et. al 2018). 
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square mile Promise Zone, a status that grants the area priority in receiving grant funding for 
revitalization and “ladders of opportunity” (City of San Antonio 2014). This newfound attention 
to the neighborhood from affluent homeowners, federal designations, and local programs make 
Dignowity Hill a tumultuous site of change in a previously-neglected area.  
However, despite the increasing renovation and construction, Dignowity Hill children 
suffer from high levels of lead in their blood . This area is also the site of more frequent 5
lead-based paint abatement than the rest of the city, due to the age of the housing stock 
(Collinger 2019). Most structures in this historical district were built before 1978, meaning many 
of them are painted with lead-based paint which is in the process of chipping or flaking. Houses 
that are renovated by city programs or developers look remarkably more refurbished than many 
of the neighboring houses, further complicating the hybrid nature of Dignowity Hill as an area of 
older, deteriorating homes, newly-constructed affluent homes, and previously-hazardous 
refurbished homes. These different houses and rented properties create a mosaic of various 
housing conditions: AirBnBs sit next to abandoned homes, and large barking dogs roam the front 
yards of houses next to historically-protected mansions. This patchwork of disparate dwelling 
spaces reflects a moment of uncertainty for the future of the neighborhood. The housing stock of 
Dignowity Hill is conditioned by historic district restrictions, opportunistic investors, long-time 
residents, and renovation projects, coalescing in a neighborhood that suffers disproportionately 
from toxic building materials. Therefore, understanding how homes are categorized for 
renovation in this neighborhood provides insights into how public health policies play a role in 
5 ​In 2017, 3.33% of children in Dignowity Hill were reported as having dangerous levels of lead content 
(more than 5 μg/dL) in their blood, according to state data (Collinger 2019). 
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shaping the cityscape; only the houses that contain “qualified” residents can access renovation 
assistance and attain a “developed” or “safe” status. 
 
The Pursuit of Applicable Clients 
The San Antonio Green and Healthy Homes (GHH) program is administered by the San 
Antonio Neighborhood and Housing Services Department (NHSD). Their goal, after receiving 
the federal HUD grant money which funds the program, is to seek out households that meet the 
eligibility requirements as outlined in the grant. City employees then guide qualifying 
households through the bureaucratic processes of retrieving paperwork and agreeing to certain 
conditions before contracting the renovation to begin. Unlike other home repair programs offered 
by San Antonio NHSD which function on a first-come, first-served basis , GHH struggles to find 6
many applicants without extensive advertising. Because the grant only applies to a limited subset 
of the San Antonio population, NHSD gives talks, lessons, organizes outreach campaigns, and 
partners with other city programs to try to maximize the number of qualified people reached by 
GHH’s resources. The leaders of NHSD are intimately familiar with all of the complicated 
conditions and terms of the program’s grant requirements, and spend much of their working 
hours explaining the ins and outs of the program to those who might potentially benefit from it.  
By interviewing the city employees involved with finding and processing clients, I came 
to better understand how local policies construct lead-based contamination as a threat to public 
health, and the processes they require to enact change and replacement of aging infrastructure. 
6 The most popular of these is the Owner-Occupied Rehabilitation program, which gives out loans for 
home repairs to address hazards. 
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The ways in which policies allocate resources for managing toxicity speaks to how state systems 
in the United States create a public health ideal to which policies adhere. These analyses, in 
combination with the perspectives of the residents affected, aim to better situate large-scale 
public health policies in local environments, and examine how this specific city department sees 
its role in providing resources to residents in need. These local techniques paint a particular 
picture of who is the most in danger in a lead-contaminated home, allowing for a deeper 
investigation of how the city aims to develop “healthy homes” through lead abatement. 
 
LITERATURE 
Housing and Lead in Environmental Health 
Much has been written in the field of public health about the extraordinary significance of 
housing and neighborhood conditions for health in urban populations. As Shaw (2004) noted in 
her review of housing’s effect on health, environmental conditions create cumulative health 
effects that add up over the course of a lifetime. Even without toxic contamination, housing 
conditions can have profound effects on physical health as well as social or psychological 
well-being. The built environment is conditioned by a framework of policies which lay out 
building codes, zoning procedures, and other such legislation which provides a standard by 
which housing conditions are judged (Perdue, Stone, and Gostin 2003). As is evident in Sargent 
et al.’s (2003) case study of Massachusetts, local or state governments often intervene in the 
event of toxic contamination in an effort to restore housing to an acceptably healthy standard. 
Environmental justice theory concerning man-made toxins focuses on the importance of 
historical processes that leave current societies to deal with the aftermath of past negligence or 
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ignorance of dangerous threats to living spaces (Pellow 2000). Within the study of environmental 
inequality, lead contamination is often used as an indicator of aging infrastructure that 
disproportionately impacts populations at the margins of society (White, Bonhila, and Ellis 
2016). Not only do these catastrophes primarily affect the most socioeconomically vulnerable, 
but they may also play a part in perpetuating disadvantage. Toxic environments have recently 
begun to show associations with decreased social mobility (Manduca and Sampson 2019). 
Policies and institutions allow such contamination to happen through widespread adoption of 
infrastructure practices that become the accepted norm and are slow to change (Werner 2006). 
However, despite these structural factors, the burden of responsibility to restore toxic 
environments is often placed on the victims themselves, forcing them to organize and prove their 
situation is sufficiently harmful (Pellow 2007). 
 
Community Understandings of Toxicity 
Community perceptions of toxic environments can vary wildly between different 
geographic and social areas, impacting the ways in which victims conceptualize their issues. As 
Brown (1992) noted, victims of toxic contamination often rely on “popular epidemiology,” a 
practice of retracing the issue back to its roots through community cooperation and 
communication. However, the understanding of the problem can take many different forms. Boi 
(2001) emphasized how official responses, or lack thereof, from government institutions 
regarding toxic emergencies can instill “toxic fear” in a community which spreads distrust in 
policy decisions. “Toxic uncertainty,” on the other hand, is a result of a general community 
understanding of the threat, but only vague ideas of who is to blame. According to Auyero and 
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Swistun (2008), this is the result of “relational anchoring” of risk perceptions in which there is 
no single disaster that points to a clear cause of the toxicity because the effects are slow and 
build up over time. This is compounded by the “labor of confusion” enacted by major institutions 
to create uncertainty, in which they take contradictory actions that betray official statements 
(Auyero and Swistun 2008). This labor of confusion is an intentional strategy employed by 
government and corporate institutions to further muddy the waters and make it difficult for 
victims to assign blame for the contamination. Singer (2011) later built upon this concept with 
the idea of “toxic frustration”: a phenomenon in which victims of toxicity are reasonably certain 
about the causes of the problem, but try to avoid thinking about it because they are unsure of 
how to change anything. However, this is not indicative of pure submissiveness of the victims. 
On the contrary, they want to do something to change their situation but are not sure how. 
Because of a lack of pull with the leaders responsible, the direct causes of these abstract threats 
become difficult to encounter by the citizen. Such perceptions around toxic contamination 
inform how communities respond to threats, as well as how they interact with institutions to 
receive help in restoring their environment.  
The divide between citizens and established experts on contamination is another 
well-studied area that informs how victims interact with institutions through individual or 
community activism (Fischer 2000). Barnes (1999) examined how community activists in Brazil 
calling for support in welfare were seen as less legitimate by government and business 
institutions when they were more organized. Less-organized movements, though not very 
effective at enacting changes, were perceived to be more authentic by these institutions because 
they represented a less-polished voice of the people. Citizen interaction with expertise about 
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toxic contamination requires community members to obtain information wherever they can find 
it and distribute it among their fellow community members. Those with lived experiences of 
toxic contamination then apply expertise they learn through “citizen scientists” to their own 
situation to enact change (Johnson et. al 2014). Much of this previous literature has revolved 
around the actions taken by citizens to obtain interventions for environmental hazards. However, 
this thesis will take a different approach by examining a government system attempting to 
intervene in a hazard (lead-based paint) that is anthropogenic and invisible to many of those who 
suffer from it. 
 
Constructing Public Health 
Michel Foucault, in his (1976) articulation of biopower, describes the concept as 
representing a shift from the “right to death” present in Western feudal societies, in which the 
sovereign exercised power primarily through the mode of subtraction, with sovereign power’s 
ultimate right to inflict death. Foucault contrasts this with production, in which subjects are 
produced according to their productivity rather than being subtracted for transgressions against 
the sovereign.​ ​The shift to a biopolitical system puts a new focus on managing bodies through 
knowledge-making and surveillance regimes, fulfilling power’s new charge to proliferate, 
channel, and maintain life in its collective instantiation within a society. 
Modern biopolitics is organized around statistics and metrics which can be used to 
describe and apprehend populations, making them available for optimization and adjustment. 
The Disability-Adjusted Life Year is an example of such a quantitative metric utilized by the 
discipline of public health to measure morbidity and mortality. The DALY is a numeric 
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representation of the number of healthy years of  life lost to morbidity and/or mortality for a 
given disease or condition. Developed by the World Bank, this measurement was meant to 
describe the economic potential blunted by specific diseases and conditions in a form that could 
be easily compared across countries and diseases/conditions. Subsequently, it was used to inform 
interventions to minimize the impact of disease on productive life, prioritizing efficiency of 
human bodies and usefulness to a global system of labor and production  (Murray 1994). Anand 
and Hanson proposed that the implicit values and assumptions enforced by the DALY are 
flawed: those with physical disabilities whose lives are already considered “lost” by the DALY 
would not contribute any more to the disease burden if they contracted a disease unrelated to 
their disability (Anand and Hanson 1997). This, along with other methodological issues, might 
have severe consequences in how the DALY, invoked to distribute resources according to its 
measured burden of disease, organizes where the most public health need is located 
demographically. 
Such public health constructions categorize the population into groups and prioritize 
where resources can be most useful. The dominance of the DALY in public health discourse is a 
result of its supposed objective and scientific nature. Even though it implicitly involves values 
about the way suffering should be quantified, it poses as a “rational and unbiased mechanism for 
conjuring the future.” (Montoya 2013). Moreover, it makes an implicit assumption that suffering 
can​ be quantified at all. These dynamics which emphasize maximizing bodily productivity of 
public health are consistent with discourses surrounding San Antonio’s GHH program: in local 
coverage of the lead abatement grant, a city director stated that they “want those kids to be as 
competitive as they can be without something out of their control affecting their development or 
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growth” (Riker 2019). In the following fieldwork and analysis, I will illustrate how these themes 
coalesce into a particular imaginary of the lead-contaminated home, and how the city utilizes this 
imaginary to obtain health outcomes they may market as “successful.” 
 
METHODS 
Between October of 2019 and February of 2020, I interviewed a variety of actors 
involved in the lead paint abatement and removal process in San Antonio. This included 
interviewing city and non-profit employees involved with GHH, as well as walking the streets of 
Dignowity Hill and interviewing residents who had gone through the GHH renovation process. 
In some cases, I met these residents by compiling public abatement data and knocking on doors 
of houses that had been renovated. Other times, I was referred to past GHH clients through city 
employees or other residents. When meeting with city or non-profit employees, I would meet at 
their office and speak with them about their particular expertise with the program. These 
interviews were mostly one-on-one, save for one interview with two “promotoras” who worked 
as a team to promote the GHH program. I met with residents who had participated in GHH in 
their renovated homes, where they would show me specific areas where work was done. 
Sometimes, other family members would be around the house and would share their own 
experiences during the renovation process. Finally, I attended one lead inspection and risk 
assessment (LIRA) at a home that was not enrolled in GHH but another home repair program 
offered by NHSD. I shadowed the contractors leading the inspection as they explained their 
process, and also asked the residents some questions about their experiences. For the sake of 
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confidentiality, all of the names of the residents and city employees have been changed, and all 
identifying information has been omitted.  
I also collected observational data on over thirty homes in Dignowity Hill that had been 
renovated through GHH. I primarily took these notes while walking door-to-door around 
different houses, but I also took notes within the homes of resident informants, paying special 
attention to how their houses compared to neighboring houses. Other information I collected 
involved looking over any documents I could find related to the program, including funding 
notices from HUD, applications from NHSD, and media materials given by NHSD to promote 
GHH. These data helped me gain an understanding of the institutional structure around GHH and 
the methods by which city employees encounter and interact with residents 
 
CENTERING THE CHILD IN A LEAD-BASED HOME 
National Priorities Becoming Local Realities 
Since 2000, the City of San Antonio Neighborhood and Housing Services Department 
(NHSD) applied to and received federal grant funding from HUD to remove or remediate 
lead-based paint in houses. Under the program entitled San Antonio Green and Healthy Homes 
(GHH), NHSD removes or remediates lead-based paint from around 70 houses per year, and has 
remediated over 1,600 houses over the program’s lifespan (Huertas 2019). NHSD reapplies for 
HUD grant funding every three years, and according to one city official involved with 
overseeing the program, the awarded grant money continues to increase every three-year funding 
period. This official, whom I will call Wesley, was one of my main informants from the city and 
had been working with GHH almost since it began. When he first told me that the funding for 
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GHH was increasing every grant period, it took me by surprise. In an era where the federal 
government is actively cutting grant programs for housing , it seemed improbable that a 7
fully-funded renovation program for low-income residents of houses with lead-based paint 
would consistently receive increased federal funds. When I asked Wesley about this increase in 
funding, he could only offer speculation as to why the federal grants were growing:  
It could be that the head of HUD now is Dr. [Ben] Carson, so he’s a doctor 
who understands. Maybe he’s allocating more funding [to lead abatement] 
because he knows about health effects on children… and then [HUD] has to pitch 
it to Congress, and Congress has to agree, so I’m sure they’re increasing the 
funding with better justifications and needs assessments. 
 
I pressed Wesley on other potential explanations: could it be a result of inflation? Of 
increasing labor costs for the renovations? Wesley flatly rejected these possible reasons, stating 
that GHH requests funds by calculating the total cost of renovation per house in different areas of 
the city, and that HUD has been funding enough for more homes every funding period.  
Of course, the HUD grants that fund GHH are not without specific requirements 
regarding the types of residents that may apply. As outlined by NHSD, only households who met 
the following HUD grant conditions can apply to receive assistance from GHH: 
1. House must be built prior to 1978 ;  AND  8
2. House must be located within the City of San Antonio;  AND  
3. House must be structurally sound to receive assistance; AND 
7 ​President Trump’s 2020 Fiscal Year plan proposed an 18% cut in HUD funding, over 9.6 billion dollars 
(National Low Income Housing Coalition 2019). 
8 ​All consumer use of lead-based paint was banned in 1978 (Environmental Protection Agency 2019). 
While a positive test for lead content in the home’s paint is not listed in these initial qualifications, the 
city will only carry out the renovation if the house is, after a Lead Inspection and Risk Assessment 
conducted by city contractors, found to contain a hazardous amount of lead content in its paint (City of 
San Antonio 2018). 
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4. A child age 5 and under must reside in the home or spend at least 
6 hours per week in the home; AND 
5. Have a clear title to property; AND  
6. Must be current with property taxes; AND 
7. Household must meet [fiscal year 2018] HUD established Income 
Guidelines for families earning 80% or below of Area Median 
Income . 9
As I will illustrate in this and the following section, federal guidelines attached to the 
grants which fund GHH restrict who may apply according to demographic categories. These 
restrictions are justified through dominant discourses regarding the maximization of “positive 
public health” outcomes. They shape the nature of the GHH program and provide normative 
structures of health upon which the moral impetus driving housing renovations is founded. 
Despite the fact that lead-based paint exists in certain houses regardless of who lives in them, 
certain kinds of residents are given priority based on medical knowledge created and sustained 
by public health institutions.  
Wesley’s speculation regarding the reasons why GHH continues to receive increased 
federal funding is notable for its clear reliance on widely-accepted priorities about the hazards of 
lead-based paint. Lead poisoning is often discussed in regard to its impact on children, despite 
the fact that prolonged lead exposure can have detrimental effects on adults as well (Schneitzer 
1990). Medical and sociological literature on the subject of lead and lead exposure has long 
9 For a family of four, this income limit is $53,450 (City of San Antonio 2018, Table 1). The 2017 median 
household income of Bexar County (which contains San Antonio) was $54,575. The 2017 median 
household income of Dignowity Hill was $24,744 (UT Health 2017). 
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focused heavily on the child as the object of concern, analyzing lead’s effects on growth, 
education, and other health outcomes (Swartz, Angle and Pitcher 1986, Needleman 1988, 
Miranda 2007). Wesley’s belief that HUD’s renewed interest in lead-based paint was due to 
Secretary Ben Carson’s experience as a medical doctor relied on an assumption that, at least in 
this specific issue, doctors could better assign resources where they are needed using the 
“objective” criteria of health outcomes. This assumption that the program’s system of 
prioritization is based on objective medical knowledge serves to further legitimize GHH as an 
executive program accomplishing needed tasks for the sake of public health and safety. By 
referencing “health effects on children” as the primary justification for funding a program like 
GHH, Wesley incorporated the local renovation of houses within a broader national mission of 
preserving child development. As he explained, child health is a powerful justification that plays 
well in political arenas (“HUD has to pitch it to Congress”), and therefore is a useful tool for 
making sure GHH warrants sufficient funding.  
Ong (2006) has discussed the neoliberal exceptions allowed by nation-states to 
competitively position themselves in the global marketplace. These spaces of exception, such as 
China’s special market zones within their socialist economic structure, re-engineer political 
standards to favor neoliberal modes of optimization. Such neoliberal exceptions reorganize 
citizenship into the allocation of benefits and rights according to people’s marketability rather 
than their membership in a state. In the realm of health interventions, this phenomenon takes the 
form of relying on population-level data to determine how to “best” assign resources.  
Montoya’s (2013) analysis of HIV/AIDS intervention in Vietnam describes the transition 
from an “enforcement” model to a US-led model of “adherence,” which relies on newer 
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“technoscientific knowledges” to calculate risk and cost-benefit analysis. He calls this 
incorporation of neoliberal tendencies which value rational optimization into humanitarian 
intervention an “economy of virtue,” in which non-governmental organizations (NGOs) trade in 
virtue, or moral good, for symbolic and real capital (Montoya 2012). While Montoya applies his 
analysis to the specific ways humanitarianism operates in Vietnam to gain credentials and win 
resources, I borrow similar concepts to describe the ways in which local San Antonio systems, 
both governmental and non-governmental, translate the material issue of lead-based paint into a 
virtuous pursuit of positive public health outcomes for the sake of the child. These public health 
outcomes, which are measurable indicators of “success” in individual houses, are transferable 
into capital used to maintain, sustain and legitimize public programs. 
The marketability of child health was obviously an important part of GHH’s legitimacy, 
as Wesley’s insistence that it justified strong federal funding implied. Neoliberal modes of 
calculating and maintaining maximum benefit to health was a tool of NHSD to give GHH a 
legitimate purpose in the national pursuit of improving child health. Technoscientific 
knowledges inform these local priorities, placing their mission in line with the scientific 
community’s insistence that children must be saved from lead exposure to protect their 
development as productive citizens. Although the guidelines previously listed are determined by 
the federal grant requirements of HUD, it is the local government systems like NHSD which 
operationalize these national priorities and give them life through public events, programs, and 
interventions. As the next section will illustrate, the focus on children’s health in relation to lead 
permeated the variety of promotional materials and events held by the city to reach potential 
residents of contaminated houses.  
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Familiarizing the Home 
To promote the various housing renovation programs offered by the city, the 
Neighborhood Housing Services Department (NHSD) holds various community events designed 
to find eligible families. Early in my fieldwork, I attended one such event hosted at a local 
church’s community center. Entitled “Day of the Living Lead,” the event was a 
Halloween-themed housing hazard awareness fair in which families were encouraged to bring 
their children to enjoy Halloween face-painting, pumpkin-carving, music and other activities. 
Lining the edges of the room were booths staffed by NHSD and non-profit employees associated 
with housing renovation and assistance programs. The event was fairly popular: almost every 
booth was occupied with adult residents (of which there were around thirty) asking questions and 
picking up flyers, while their children played in the center of the room. Over the sound of 
youthful playing and laughing, residents of potentially hazardous homes could learn about city 
programs that offered various levels of funding for renovation depending on the type of hazard. 
Among these programs was Green and Healthy Homes, offering fully-funded renovations to 
households who met the conditions listed in the previous section. 
All of the information about application requirements and timeline of GHH was available 
in a relatively raw form to families via a myriad of paper handouts and city employees 
explaining the guidelines. By offering kid-friendly attractions, the event freed parents’ attention 
and allowed them to evaluate their options for home improvements and hazard removal. Despite 
the dry, dense nature of the bureaucratic programs being advertised, the overall tone of the event 
was welcoming and fun-loving, marketing GHH and other programs as initiatives that are 
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especially child-centric. The tables that were not advertising housing programs belonged to 
child-related services and programs, such as the afterschool education and health program Head 
Start. Although the issue of housing hazards is not specific to homes with children, and multiple 
programs in attendance offered their services to households without children, this event centered 
the child as the primary beneficiary of state-assisted housing renovations . 10
This intentional focus on the child permeated community events such as the one 
described above, as well as various media distributed by NHSD. Once during an interview with 
Wesley, the NHSD employee, he opened a drawer full of old GHH media materials and handed 
me a DVD. On the disk label were the cartoon faces of four characters under the title “Molly’s 
Adventures in Safety, Volume 1: Lead.” This ten-minute animated educational cartoon follows 
Molly, a child who investigates an anthropomorphic house who is feeling “sick,” and eventually 
finds signs that the house may contain lead in its paint, such as flaking paint on windowsills and 
dusty areas (Figure 1). A live-action adult “scientist” explains to Molly how these are signs of 
lead paint in the house. The scientist then shows the team of kid investigators real footage of 
workers replacing the paint on the exterior of a house. The cartoon house is then cured, ending 
Molly’s investigation. Before fading to black, the DVD shows before-and-after pictures of 
houses renovated by GHH . It then displays the “Lead Safe San Antonio” campaign logo above 11
a notice indicating that the cartoon was the result of funding from the “2007 Lead Hazard 
10 It is also important to note that the detrimental impacts of lead are also cumulative, meaning those who 
are exposed to lead over longer periods of time (such as the elderly) may face more severe consequences. 
This, however, may not be readily apparent in the public health vision, due to the way metrics such as the 
DALY are calculated. 
11 Similar images appear frequently on information sheets and brochures for GHH, showing 
newly-painted “after” houses next to older, dilapidated-looking “before” houses. 
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Reduction Demonstration grant awarded by HUD’s Office of Healthy Homes and Lead Hazard 
Control.” 
I linger on this piece of promotional-educational material to illustrate the extent to which 
San Antonio NHSD insists on spreading the word about lead hazard in houses through 
engagement with children. Rather than finding houses to renovate by looking only for parents, 
GHH utilizes a bottom-up approach which positions the child as the primary agent upon which 
lead hazards pose a threat. In “Molly’s Adventure,” no adults are shown to be living in the house. 
The only people inside are Molly and her team of other kids and cartoon animals. These 
narratives about the child transform the contaminated “house” into a sick “home”; Green and 
Healthy Homes is not just fixated on fixing non-living houses, but living homes which are 
composed of children living in unhealthy surroundings. By offering housing services information 
in the context of a child health issue, the Halloween event and the educational cartoon equated 
the physical living space of the house with the social unit of a child-bearing family. Thus the 
material issue of the deteriorating living structure becomes a moral mission revolving around 
protecting children’s healthy development. 
Such a mission of maximizing and sustaining human life, as discussed previously, is 
predicated upon a specific set of biomedical knowledge which claims objective truth over the 
hazards lead poses to child health. This medical legitimacy is a tool for gaining resources and 
credentials for programs like GHH, but it relies upon health metrics collected by various 
agencies at different levels of the state. These metrics, at a population level, are reportable to 
federal agencies to warrant funding from HUD and other sources. They compose the scientific 
knowledge which justifies state intervention in renovating houses. At an individual level, they 
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qualify different houses for assistance from GHH by assigning metrics like child blood lead 
levels, which, though measured in a person, are attributed to a house instead. The following 
section will explore how qualification relies on meeting these sufficiently hazardous measures of 
ill health. 
 
Discovering the Afflicted 
As part of their outreach campaign to find more affected residents, Green and Healthy 
Homes partnered with Family Service Association (FSA)  to hire two “promotoras,” women 12
who led block-walking campaigns primarily in the East Side of San Antonio. This focus on the 
East Side was likely influenced by the previously mentioned “East Side Promise Zone” federal 
designation, which gains the area preference for grant funding. For ten years starting around 
2009, the promotoras went door-to-door to houses that were constructed prior to 1978. Using city 
records to find these houses, they would inform the residents about the GHH program. Because 
houses without child residents could still qualify if a child spent at least 6 hours per week there, 
the promotoras would visit any houses built before 1978, regardless of the recorded household 
makeup. If interested, the residents would be walked through the application process. The 
promotoras carried portable image scanners to scan documents like bank statements and 
identification in order to submit their application to NHSD and begin the lead testing process if 
found eligible.  
12 ​FSA is a local non-profit focused on providing families in San Antonio with social work, counseling, 
and fundraising for various local charities (Family Service Association 2016) 
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I interviewed these two women, Rita and Carolina, after multiple city employees had 
mentioned their diligent work and the high number of “clients” they brought into the program. 
During our conversation, Carolina was typically the first to answer my questions, and would 
occasionally look to Rita for confirmation about certain details or anecdotes about their time 
block-walking. They were clearly experienced community workers who thoroughly enjoyed 
interacting with the residents they worked with: though it wasn’t part of their job description, 
they often followed up with eligible residents to see how their renovation was going. These 
promotoras had the most regular face-to-face interactions with residents relative to anyone I 
spoke to, and seemed to have endless stories about block-walking. When I asked about the most 
difficult parts about finding willing residents, Carolina informed me that for the first two years of 
their work, the children living in the homes had to be tested for blood lead content before their 
application could be accepted.  
At first, [the residents] didn't want the children to be poked , because at 13
first you needed to have the child tested for lead. And that was one of the policies, 
asking, “Do you want to have the children tested?” [The fear of the test] really 
didn't make sense because if you want your child to be healthy and you have to, 
you would want to know. Right? 
 
Carolina looked to Rita at this moment, who confirmed the information about the lead 
test and, presumably, Carolina’s sentiment about the logic of fearing the test. As Carolina 
described it, the blood test posed a significant barrier to residents entering the program, because 
it required their children to have their finger pricked for a blood test, and many parents “didn’t 
want to hear their child cry.” This perceived reasoning for parents’ hesitation to agree to the 
13 ​The blood test necessary to check the blood’s lead level requires the child’s finger to be pricked.  
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program seemed illogical to Carolina, who placed value in the collection of data for the sake of 
knowing how safe the surroundings are, especially for the sake of the children. However, as 
Carolina then explained, this requirement of a blood test for eligibility was discontinued, leaving 
only a house lead inspection as a requirement to confirm the lead hazard. From then on, the 
promotoras’ duty was only to walk them through the application and process their paperwork 
without the blood test referral. The only types of measurements required to qualify for GHH at 
this point (around 2011) were fiscal and institutional qualifications, requiring residents to prove 
their ownership of the house and their income level, in addition to having a child of age 5 or 
younger. By meeting these qualifications, residents could then go ahead with the lead inspection 
and risk assessment by city contractors. 
Although I had heard about Rita and Carolina’s work from several people, it was not until 
I spoke with them that I was informed that they were no longer working with GHH, as of 
October 2019. “The funding, for us, just ran out,” Rita said without much more knowledge of 
why. “Things changed [at GHH] throughout the years,” Carolina later offered. “Starting two 
years ago, we weren’t block-walking no more, because [GHH] was coming out more in the 
media and news. So that’s the way we were getting applications. [Residents] were coming to the 
[NHSD] office and we would process their application there.”  
The initial vague understanding of why they were no longer partnered with GHH (“the 
funding just ran out”) coupled with an understanding of the changing ways GHH encountered 
residents was mirrored in another interview I had with Christina, an NHSD employee involved 
with outreach at GHH. Since she worked directly with the promotoras quite often, I asked if she 
knew why they were no longer partnered with GHH. After shaking her head, she told me, 
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exasperated, “That would be a management question,” then describing the changes that GHH’s 
outreach had undergone shortly after. 
“At the beginning, that's what [the promotoras] would do. Block-walking. I would 
go block-walking with them sometimes. And I think the program has really 
evolved since that time. You know what I mean? ‘Cause a lot of times people 
don't want to answer their door... And we leave flyers and stuff and they'll, a lot of 
times they'll call us back, but I think now that the program, like I said, it's evolved 
to where we piggyback off of [other programs], we've got strong partnerships 
with Head Start.” 
Instead of block-walking, Christina described how GHH now had a more established 
reputation and partnerships with other programs on which they would “piggyback.” For example, 
if other programs like NHSD’s Owner-Occupied Rehabilitation  were dealing with a house that 14
was found to have lead and occupied by a child, GHH would be notified and would provide 
funding for the lead abatement. Similar to Carolina, Christina noted differences in how residents 
encountered Green and Healthy Homes in recent years. Rather than going door-to-door and 
seeking out applicants, the program was receiving referrals through partnerships and 
word-of-mouth. More specifically, Christina repeatedly pointed out that their partnership with 
Head Start, the afterschool early education program, was an especially fruitful pathway through 
which families are referred to GHH. 
14 Unlike GHH, this NHSD program only offers loans instead of grants for home renovations, and is a 
more limited-scope project. 
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GHH receives many referrals based on child blood lead levels (BLLs) from Head Start, 
which works  with 3,236 children ages three to five. When I spoke with Dawn, an employee at 15
Head Start who worked directly with GHH through Christina, she explained that starting in 2013, 
Head Start began providing free onsite lead tests (the same finger-prick tests that were no longer 
a GHH prerequisite in 2011, according to Carolina). Ninety-nine percent of Head Start families, 
Dawn explained, are on Medicaid, and by Texas law, children on Medicaid are required to have 
their blood lead levels tested at two years of age. Because most children arrive at Head Start at 
age three or four, Head Start tests them again for free and refers those with elevated blood lead 
levels to GHH. This primarily involves one of Head Start’s Family Support Workers notifying 
them of their child’s elevated BLL and informing them about GHH’s services. If they agreed, 
they would direct them to the application process for their home.  
Through the partnership with Head Start, blood lead levels once again became a measure 
through which GHH discovered new residents and collected the data necessary to make the lead 
hazard legible to systems of biomedical knowledge. They now had a method by which the health 
threat to children could be explicitly quantified and assigned to a home in an effort to label the 
household “sick” and in need of amelioration. Under the previous recruitment strategy, GHH 
could only collect information relating to home ownership and income, and then test the house. 
This sequence shifted in 2013, allowing NHSD to center the child’s health as the present danger 
rather than the material status of the house. As this became a more effective recruitment strategy, 
the promotoras’ block-walking became a less relevant technique. Instead of spending money 
15 ​This work primarily involves early education, but families at Head Start are also assigned a Family 
Support Worker who meets with them to address comprehensive needs. The program also offers 
complementary health screenings and other services. 
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hiring people to knock on the doors of older houses and find out if children frequented them, 
NHSD now had access to quantitative health data on the children themselves. Such a change in 
the sequence is, presumably, a more cost-effective measure for GHH, since Head Start handles 
the lead testing and refers them to NHSD. Besides material efficiency, this strategy more directly 
rephrases the threat of lead housing into terms of the body, measurable by doctors, and treatable 
with the right intervention. With this shift, the mechanism of recruiting residents for lead 
abatement is explicitly organized around biological data considered to be the target of 
intervention, rather than around the housing data. 
 
HOMES AS COLLECTIVE INVESTMENTS 
The Construction of a Client 
During almost all of my interviews with city employees who worked with GHH, they 
typically referred to the residents who were receiving home repairs through GHH as “clients.” In 
this paper, I have opted to use the term “residents” in my own descriptions, as I believe it 
describes a more neutral position in relation with the state. The word “client” (instead of 
“grantee” or “beneficiary”) implies a type of willing exchange between the resident and the state 
program. To me, this is a misnomer for participants in a program that provides renovations free 
of charge to the resident. In this section, however, I discuss the types of commitments requested 
of residents, which often act as barriers to potential applicants and spread fear or confusion about 
what the city “wants” with homes that participate in GHH. 
Despite multiple attempts to find the contact information of any residents that qualified 
for GHH but were unable or unwilling to go through with the application, I was unable to meet 
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with any. The city only keeps records of houses that were renovated, and I was unable to find 
any informants who could connect me to an unwilling resident. Instead, my information about 
worries or barriers to the program stems from meetings with four different residents who were 
fully processed through GHH and had their houses renovated. These interviews took place in 
their renovated houses, where they were able to show me the specific places where work was 
done. All of these homes were located in or near the Dignowity Hill neighborhood on the East 
Side of San Antonio. 
Jennifer’s house was filled with the sounds of small children babbling while they ran 
around the living room and kitchen. The house had been renovated about three months prior, so 
the exterior was still visibly refurbished in certain areas with a fresh coat of paint and new 
materials around the windows. In front of the door were a few steps and a handrail. Because we 
had had to wait to meet until Jennifer got off of work at a nearby school, we were meeting 
shortly before dinner. Jennifer’s son and his wife (who live with Jennifer and were the parents of 
the two small children) were sitting at the small kitchen table adjacent to the living room where I 
sat across from Jennifer on a couch. When I asked if I could record the interview for my notes, 
all three adults agreed and apologized repeatedly for the background noise. As I asked questions 
about the process of GHH and their experience engaging with the city, Jennifer’s son often 
jumped in eagerly to provide supporting information, looking to his wife to further substantiate 
certain details about dates or names.  
Although GHH is first and foremost concerned with lead-based paint, they will also 
repair other minor hazards in or on eligible homes free of charge. In every interview with 
residents, I noticed they tended to focus on these auxiliary renovations as the primary change that 
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impacted their everyday life . In most cases, these changes fixed long-standing issues that they 16
had wanted to fix for a while but could not due to the labor, time, or financial costs. Jennifer 
spoke extensively about how helpful the new steps and handrail were for her late husband, who 
had had a disability. However, Jennifer was also aware of the present threat of decaying paint in 
her home: she witnessed her grandchildren ingesting some of the paint flakes coming off of the 
windowsill. While she was not aware that it was lead-based paint until the city hired contractors 
to inspect the house, she knew that ingesting the paint could be dangerous and was excited to 
have the city replace her windows.  
However, when she first heard of GHH by seeing a flyer, Jennifer was very hesitant to 
apply.  
“I thought it was something where they would charge you for it,” she said. “You know 
how some people, they say, ‘it’s free,’ but it’s ​never​ free” (emphasis hers).  
“When they told me about it, I said, ‘look online, sounds too good to be true!’ Jennifer’s 
son added, laughing. “But I looked online and went to the [NHSD] office, and I told [my family], 
‘this seems legit.’” 
Despite their initial concerns, they were both extremely satisfied with the process and 
results of GHH. Because the renovations only took place on the outside of the home, they were 
able to keep living inside while the month-long project took place. Jennifer and her son both 
remarked on how accommodating the workers were and how the process to fill out the 
paperwork was relatively simple, even though they did have to submit forms multiple times 
16 ​This is unsurprising, given that lead contamination is a much less visible threat than the problems fixed 
by the auxiliary renovations. 
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because the first ones were outdated. While all of my resident informants had generally positive 
sentiments about the program, Jennifer and her family were the most enthusiastically grateful for 
the renovation and the relatively streamlined process. They were also the most recent recipients 
of GHH renovations of my informants. In this case their initial skepticism that it was “too good 
to be true” that a program would renovate their house for free was overruled by Jennifer’s son’s 
personal investigation into its legitimacy. He did not clarify what had made him change his mind 
besides speaking with NHSD representatives and looking at information available online, but he 
was willing to become one of GHH’s “clients” after certifying for himself that it was in his 
family’s best interest.  
I found that all of my resident informants mentioned a family member who assisted them 
through the application and renovation process at GHH. In fact, none of the residents I spoke 
with were actually parents of the children who qualified the home for the program, but were 
grandparents who either had grandchildren living in the home (as was the case with Jennifer) or 
simply watched over their grandchildren in the home on a regular basis. In all of these cases, the 
“clients” were not the primary caretakers of the children, but additional caretakers who still 
qualified for GHH because of the heightened lead exposure to their grandchildren. Even though 
the elderly are not the intended demographic to be impacted by this policy, their status as a 
caretaker of children still qualified their home to be sufficiently hazardous to warrant renovation. 
By letting the city come remove the lead-based paint threat, these grandparents received needed 
changes, such as Jennifer’s home’s steps and handrail. The justification for qualification with 
GHH never revolved around these structural changes or even only the lead itself, but their 
relationship to a child who was coming into contact with lead. As I mentioned, the removal of 
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the lead threat often was not the biggest perceived benefit by the resident, but rather the 
additional benefits that came with renovations, such as improved insulation due to the new 
windows. 
The perception that the renovations were free and easy were not shared by every 
informant I spoke with. Linda, another grandparent of two children who had the interior and 
exterior of her house renovated, remarked on the extensive effort she put in to both qualify for 
the program and adapt to the renovations. Because the renovations were also inside the home, 
Linda had to move all of her belongings out of the house and live with her daughter while they 
renovated. 
It’s a lot of work. It’s not easy, you don’t just make an application and you’re in. 
It’s very extensive. I broke my ankle one week before I had to move out, and [the 
city] doesn’t help you. It’s not part of their deal. So it was very extensive, my 
neighbors helped [me move out] a lot. 
 
To Linda, one of the prices of the program was the physical labor required to 
accommodate the renovations, including moving out of her home by herself. She relied heavily 
on neighbors and her daughter to get through the renovation process. Unlike with Jennifer, GHH 
representatives never updated Linda on the progress of the renovation, so she often had her 
daughter drive her by the house to check on it herself. Sometimes, she would ask the workers 
how the construction was coming along. She described her experience as much more 
independent, remarking multiple times about the amount of time it took up in her life. She had 
heard about the program through neighbors whose houses were renovated, but had had to wait 
until she was retired before she could fully commit the time necessary to apply and go through 
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the process. Her biggest difficulties came from lack of accommodation and the labor necessary 
to allow the city to fix her house.  
Whenever I asked NHSD employees about the biggest barriers residents who wanted to 
apply to GHH faced, their answers were uniformly about bureaucratic requirements which were 
complex or daunting, such as all the paperwork necessary to apply. But these perceived 
difficulties from the city side were not reflected in the experiences of the residents with whom I 
spoke. Their primary challenges seemed to be logistic ones, like making sure the program was 
legitimate, or moving out of the house on their own. This disconnect could likely be due to the 
types of residents I interviewed. They had all been successful clients who received the intended 
benefit from GHH. Those who may have had more trouble with paperwork and policies may 
have been more likely to drop out of the application process, and thus were not captured by city 
data.  
Among these bureaucratic challenges I heard about from NHSD, the most challenging 
was the “restricted covenant” requirement. This covenant signed by the resident ensures that the 
residents remain the owners of their property for five years after the renovations are completed. 
If the owners wish to sell the property before the five-year period is over, they must pay the City 
of San Antonio back a prorated portion of the grant funds used to renovate the property. In the 
following section, I will analyze this policy in particular, the difficulties that come with it from 
the city’s point of view, and the underlying justification for such a requirement. 
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Protecting Investments 
During my fieldwork, I often waited in the lobby of the San Antonio Neighborhood and 
Housing Services Department (NHSD) to meet with city informants. This small waiting area by 
the front door of the building featured a few rows of chairs next to the reception desk where 
visitors, like me, awaited meetings with various government officials to discuss programs 
regarding home remediation, financing, or other housing services. One mid-December afternoon 
while waiting for my appointment to begin, I saw a city employee and a civilian enter the lobby 
from the main office area behind the reception desk and sit across from each other at a small 
table in the corner of the waiting area. The city employee spoke with the woman across from her 
in a cordial but professional tone as she walked her through the final paperwork necessary for 
applying to the Green and Healthy Homes (GHH) lead abatement program. She started with the 
page for the five-year “restricted covenant” to which all GHH applicants must agree. The 
applicant, who appeared to be in her 60s or 70s, was familiar with the covenant and did not have 
many pressing concerns about it, except for one scenario, which she asked about after a moment 
of hesitation: 
“I don’t know if this is too morbid to ask, but what if I die? What happens to the covenant 
on the house then?” 
The NHSD employee calmly explained that, if eligible under the income guidelines, her 
next of kin to inherit the home would take over that covenant. Otherwise, the city would charge 
the prorated cost of the renovations, depending on how many years were left in the agreement. 
Seemingly satisfied with the answer, the resident agreed to sign the restricted covenant. As they 
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finished the paperwork and the client picked up her purse to leave the building, she thanked the 
employee multiple times.  
“I’m so glad the city has this program. It’s usually so expensive to do those repairs,” she 
remarked. “Thank you for the early Christmas present!” 
Wesley had previously informed me that the restricted covenant was not a part of the 
GHH application when the program first started in 2000. According to him, the city had 
encountered early problems after renovating homes without such an agreement: homeowners 
would be more likely to sell their home soon after the renovations, and landlords would often 
raise rent for tenants and force them out of their newly-refurbished dwelling space. To Wesley, 
this was a failure of the program in its early stages because the people benefiting were not 
necessarily the children who had qualified the house for renovation. As a result, the city, with 
approval from HUD, developed the restricted covenant in an effort to make sure the child lived 
in the renovated space. 
“If they were to sell the property, you know, we can reclaim some of those funds 
according to a depreciation value that they put in those five years. So we can recuperate some of 
those funds that we invested in that property if they were to put it up for sale.” 
This method of, as Wesley referred to it, “protecting our investment,” was a main source 
of anxiety for those considering applying to GHH, according to him and other NHSD employees 
I spoke to. Many applicants would go through the entire application process up to the covenant, 
but would drop out. This was especially true among renters, according to Christina, because they 
were often not planning on staying in their rented property for five entire years. Among 
homeowners, the most common concern was that the city would try to take ownership over their 
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property, which Wesley dismissed as ridiculous. “The city hates taking property,” he pointed out, 
laughing.  
The restricted covenant seemed to be the main area where the exchange between 
residents and the city took place. NHSD saw these residents as “clients” because they were 
agreeing to stay in the house for five years, and in return the city would renovate their home 
through GHH. Wesley’s repeated references to GHH as an “investment” in each home seemed to 
express that the city expects that renovations actually benefit the children who are the target 
beneficiary of the program. Once again, GHH’s mission is not to remediate the existence of 
lead-based paint wherever it exists. To be considered a success, the child must directly benefit 
from the renovated surroundings. It is only when this “investment” into child health has been 
fulfilled after five years that the client has completed their end of the bargain. While this deal 
drives some away from going through with the application, as Wesley and Christina described, 
those who do sign the agreement see the program as more or less a one-sided transaction. The 
woman in the NHSD lobby who I witnessed signing the covenant seemed to feel like she was 
receiving a gift from the city, and informants of mine such as Jennifer initially found the 
program “too good to be true.” While the city sees these residents as clients who are fulfilling a 
contract, the residents more commonly imagine themselves as beneficiaries of a free city service. 
Such a disconnect speaks to the conflicting ways in which this specific political 
relationship is conceptualized in the eyes of residents versus city employees. To residents, GHH 
is a type of state benefactor that doles out resources to those qualified. However, to NHSD, 
GHH’s purpose is to provide their clients with a home with sufficiently “healthy” surroundings, 
based on scientific measures designed to quantify the threat, such as blood lead levels or lead 
40 
 
 
inspection results. Through these quantifiable health outcomes, and the signing of the restricted 
covenant, the city tries to maximize the “positive health effects” of removing the lead on the 
specific population they want to benefit the most. 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
Lead-based paint abatement is not only about the repair of toxic infrastructure, but the 
development of healthy bodies within the homes. Permeating every level of San Antonio’s Green 
and Healthy Homes is an insistence on protecting the child. Dominant medical discourse 
prioritizing the child as the primary “at-risk” victim of lead exposure grants GHH additional 
moral weight to their agenda of renovation. This virtuous justification for the program is not only 
defined by the program’s requirements for applicants, though that does play a role by narrowing 
down who benefits from GHH to only houses containing children under six years of age. NHSD 
employees also play an active role in reifying the association between child health and removing 
lead from the home: promotional events and materials to find more applicants are catered 
towards children and position children at the center of the issue. In doing so, GHH translates the 
material threat that lead-based paint poses into a threat to the very development of a healthy 
family. Green and Healthy Homes, as its name implies, is not interested in repairing houses, but 
repairing and maintaining the “health” of the child’s home, which encompasses the people living 
inside it. 
I found in my fieldwork that this mission to maintain the bodies residing in the 
lead-contaminated home is enforced through an idea of exchange that positions the residents as 
“clients” who have a responsibility to remain in the house for at least five years. Though the 
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residents I spoke to did not see themselves as offering anything to the city in return for the 
renovation, NHSD employees saw each house renovated as an “investment” in children’s health 
that they expected to be carried through for a certain amount of time. The fact that simply 
removing the lead from a structure in the city was not a sufficient measure of success speaks to 
the insistence on making sure state resources were applied to the “right” population: children in 
low-income families. Using the language of investments, NHSD expects certain “returns” 
through the accomplishment of sufficiently “healthy” environmental standards for children. 
Unlike many previously-studied toxic hazard interventions, which are often demanded by 
citizens who can see the consequences of their contaminated surroundings, lead-based paint is a 
hazard which is largely invisible to its victims. Thus, Green and Healthy Homes represents a 
top-down approach which enables the state to define how resources are allocated according to its 
own priorities. The “client” relationship enforced by GHH politicizes the space of the home into 
a site where families are responsible for keeping the child in their newly-renovated environment. 
Whether they know it or not, residents “owe” the city a positive health outcome and are expected 
to remain living in the home because it reflects poorly on the city if their resources do not go to 
their specific kind of family. Such dynamics transform lead-based paint into an issue of 
ownership, payment and debt in which the resident is responsible for carrying out the “healthy” 
choice of not moving out. Even though the city has no legal ownership over the home, it 
becomes a site of collective investment in which taxpayer-funded government programs are 
attempting to purchase a healthier status for the children living in clients’ houses. If clients break 
this agreement, they must pay back the cost of investment, allowing the state to “recoup” their 
funds and apply them elsewhere. Such notions of maximizing health benefits by the most 
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cost-efficient methods reflect a dominant neoliberal status quo among institutions of public 
health. Each individual project of renovation is an investment which must see returns in the form 
of healthier families, turning lead-based paint into not just a physical threat to all human bodies, 
but a threat to the child’s status as a productive member of the city’s socioeconomic fabric.  
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APPENDIX 
Table 1.​ Income limits for qualification to apply to Green and Healthy Homes, based on 80% of 
HUD’s established guidelines for Area Median Income (City of San Antonio 2018).  
Size of Family Income Limit 
1 $37,450 
2 $42,800 
3 $48,150 
4 $53,450 
5 $57,750 
6 $62,050 
7 $66,300 
 
 
Figure 1.​ Screenshots from “Molly’s Adventures in Safety, Volume 1: Lead.” Images captured 
from public media materials by the City of San Antonio Neighborhood and Housing Services 
Department (2007).  
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